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Not My Brother’s Keeper: Factional Infighting 
in Armed Islamist Movements
Mohammed M. Hafez
Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
Abstract: Islamists in civil wars often prioritize their factional conflicts above the 
collective goals of their movements. They end up fighting and killing each other 
despite having mutual state adversaries and shared normative commitments. 
This reality raises an intriguing puzzle. How can Islamists justify fratricidal 
practices given the ubiquity of Quranic scripture and prophetic traditions that 
prevail upon them to unite and refrain from infighting. This article explores two 
religious narratives that rationalize violent infighting between Islamist factions. 
The Victorious Sect narrative depicts rival Islamist factions as insufficiently 
Islamic by harboring political pluralism and nationalism in their ideological 
platforms. These deviations from orthodoxy are proof of their ineligibility 
to lead the Islamist movement. The other narrative depicts rival factions as 
modern day Kharijites or Muslim extremists that must be repelled and driven 
out of the Islamist movement because they undermine its legitimacy. Although 
these narratives do not necessarily drive factional struggles for power, they are 
important because they rationalize and publicly justify the highly controversial 
act of Islamists killing one another in their quest for movement supremacy.
Keywords: Jihadism, Kharijites, victorious sect,  Islamic State, infighting, ideology
And hold fi mly to the rope of Allah all together 
and do not become divided. —Quran 3:103
In the spring of 2015, Islamic State militants marched twelve men acrossa vast desert valley for an execution. The handbound captives, dressed in 
orange jumpsuits, were led to a desolate plain with their heads forcefully 
bowed by camouflaged soldiers of the newly formed Islamic Caliphate. The 
prisoners were compelled to kneel before a camera and endure a berating 
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speech explaining their impending slaughter. At last, masked men forced the 
helpless captives to the ground and lifted their heads to expose their necks to 
their sharpened knives.
The beheading took place near the Damascus countryside and was cap-
tured in an elaborate video production with the admonishment Repent Before 
we Prevail Over You.1 At the time, Syria was in the midst of its fourth year of 
civil war, one that pitted the regime of Bashar al-Assad against rebels of vari-
ous political stripes. The executed men, however, were not captured Syrian 
soldiers that were fi hting to maintain Bashar al-Assad in power. Nor were 
they shabiha (pro-government thugs) that shot at peaceful protesters who 
had risen up in March 2011 to demand an end to authoritarian rule. They 
were not even civilians loyal to the regime or ones opposed to rebel control of 
their areas or adherents of another religious sect. The victims were members 
of Jaysh al-Islam, or the Army of Islam, a rebel faction in eastern Ghouta led 
by Zahran Alloush, an avowedly Islamist commander who wanted to create 
an Islamic state, too. Th s was a case of Islamists killing other Islamists.
Th s episode of rebel fratricide raises an interesting puzzle. How could 
Islamists execute fellow Islamists presumably fi hting on the same side of 
the war? Both factions adhere to Salafism, the most puritanical strand of 
Islamism, yet this ideological similarity did not serve as a break on their mu-
tual bloodletting. Indeed, the Islamic State’s execution of rebels belonging to 
Jaysh al-Islam was met with swift retaliation. The latter proceeded to execute 
eighteen Islamic State prisoners and publicized the carnage in an online 
video that mimicked the one produced earlier by its rival.2 Th s time it was 
the executioners who dressed in orange jumpsuits and their victims donned 
black masks as they were shot in the back of the head. Why would Islamists 
in the midst of a grueling civil war kill each other?
The Islamic tradition contains several injunctions against excessive fac-
tionalism and violent infi hting among Muslims. Takfir, the act of Muslims 
calling other Muslims infid ls, has been the prevailing method by which 
radical Islamists denounce their secular rulers and even Islamist rivals.3 As 
such, it has received a great deal of attention in the scholarly literature. I will 
1The video was produced by the Islamic State’s Media Offic of Wilayat Damascus 
and released on June 25, 2015 through Twitter (https://twitter.com/sa3d_d12/sta-
tus/613994466421145600). 
2The video was titled The Mujahidin’s Retribution for the People of the Levant Upon 
the Renegade Kharijites and released on June 30, 2015 through Twitter (https://twitter.
com/IslamArmy02/status/616022593850748928).
3Bunzel 2019, 13–22.
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not address it here because I have dealt with it elsewhere.4 Instead, I will focus 
on two other narratives that rationalize the shedding of Islamist blood at the 
hands of rival Islamists.
The fi st asserts that the Victorious Sect (al-taifa al-mansoura) is fi hting 
pseudo Islamists who are insuffici tly righteous because they harbor heresies 
such as political pluralism, nationalism, and pragmatism into their ideological 
platforms. These deviations from religious orthodoxy are presented as proof 
of their ineligibility to lead the Islamist movement and potentially threaten to 
betray the Victorious Sect that bears the authentic Islamic creed. The coun-
ternarrative claims that the so-called Victorious Sect is nothing more than 
neo-Kharijites (khawarij al-‘asr) that must be repelled and killed until they cease 
their aggression. Kharijites, those who secede from the community, emerged 
in early Islamic history and fought Ali Bin Abi Talib, the fourth of the Rightly 
Guided caliphs in the Sunni tradition. They eventually assassinated him in 661 
C.E. They have earned the reputation of being renegades beyond the pale.5
These competing narratives suggest that Islamists, similar to militant 
nationalist and communist movements, are not immune to splintering and 
fi hting with their proximate ideological rivals.6 The question of how central 
are these dueling ideological narratives in driving factional infi hting is a 
subject of an emerging debate.7 These narratives rationalize and publicly jus-
tify fratricide in Islamist movements, but are they suffici t to cause factional 
infi hting? The quest for power within a fragmented rebel movement is usually 
driven by a number of worldly factors, such as the need to secure territory 
and resources for one’s faction, capture the lion’s share of the post-confli t 
political spoils, or fulfill the interests of external state sponsors. Therefore, 
one cannot reduce factional dynamics to competing ideological narratives 
without also accounting for other important material and conjunctural fac-
tors that shape the struggle for movement supremacy. Nonetheless, publicly 
justifying infi hting among Islamists has become an important dimension of 
this competition for power.
The Puzzle of Fratricide in Islamist Movements
Islamists infi hting in the context of a civil war is puzzling in two respects. 
First, infi hting has proven to be self-defeating in recent history. In the last 
4Hafez 2011, 25–46.
5Crone 2006; Kenney 2006.
6Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012, 265–283.
7Fjelde and Nilsson 2012, 604–628; Pischedda 2018, 138–176; Gade, Hafez, and 
Gabbay 2019, 321–335.
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three decades, Islamists enmeshed in civil wars in Algeria (1992–1999), Iraq 
(2003–2011), and Syria (2011–2019) have descended into internecine confli ts 
that divided their ranks, alienated their supporters, and cost them their bid 
for power. From the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, to al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
to the Islamic State, each of these organizations had perfect opportunities to 
topple their regimes. Yet, in the midst of civil wars, despite having mutual 
state adversaries and shared normative commitments, these Islamists turned 
their guns on fellow rebels, choosing to pursue hegemonic leadership over 
coalitional unity. In fact, they assisted incumbent elites in crisis by handing 
them the perfect opportunity to divide-and-conquer their movements.
Rebel victory depends, in part, on rebels harnessing their scarce resources 
to challenge incumbent regimes with a preponderance of military power. Unity 
is believed to improve rebels’ fi hting capabilities, making them difficult to 
defeat.8 During the 1980s, the United States and Pakistan incentivized major 
Afghan factions to work collectively during their anti-Soviet struggle, result-
ing in victory for the Afghan mujahidin. They drove out the Soviet occupiers 
in 1989 and toppled the remnant Communist regime in 1992. Conversely, 
infi hting consumes rebel lives and resources, enables incumbent regimes to 
manipulate rivalries, and sometimes prompts rebel defections to the state.9 
The United States and its western and Gulf allies, despite their vast resources, 
failed to forge a united coalition against the regime of Bashar al-Assad and 
his regional and international allies, resulting in the defeat of the anti-Assad 
rebels. The rebels, many of whom were Islamists, became too divided and 
were consumed by violent infi hting.
The second puzzle relates to how Islamists can rationalize violent in-
fi hting among themselves given the ubiquity of Islamic injunctions against 
division and strife among believers. The theme of Islamic brotherhood is well 
established in the Quranic scripture and prophetic traditions. The Quran,10 
for example, reminds Muslims in verse 3:103:
And hold fi mly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided. 
And remember the favor of Allah upon you—when you were enemies and 
He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favor, brothers.
Ibn Kathir interprets “the rope of Allah” as God’s covenant, and “do not become 
divided” as a clear entreaty against splitting from the jama‘ah (congregation 
8Akcinaroglu 2012, 886.
9Staniland 2012, 16–40.
10All the translations of Quranic verses in this article come from The Noble Qur’an, 
available at https://quran.com/?local=en. 
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of believers) after embracing Islam.11 The verse recalls the peace that emerged 
between the dueling tribes of Banu Aws and Banu Khazraj after the Prophet 
mediated their confli t and they became Ansar, Muslims of Medina. The 
Prophet reminded them of the consequences of their enmity as the potential 
for confli t arose among the Ansar over the issue of allocating war spoils. Ac-
cording to Ibn Kathir, Muhammad reproached them thusly: “O Ansar! Did 
I not fi d you misguided and God directed you to guidance because of me? 
Were you not divided beforehand and God united you around me? Were you 
not poor and God enriched you because of me?”12
The Quran acknowledges the possibility of Muslims fi hting with one 
another, but promptly enjoins the believers to reestablish unity in verses 
49:10–12:
The believers are but brothers, so make settlement between your brothers. 
. . . And do not insult one another and do not call each other by [offensive] 
nicknames. . . . And do not spy or backbite each other. Would one of you 
like to eat the fle h of his brother when dead? You would detest it.
Verse 61:4 reminds Muslims of the importance of unity in battle, something 
quite relevant to Islamist civil wars: “Indeed, Allah loves those who fi ht in 
His cause in a row as though they are a [single] structure joined fi mly.” And 
verse 8:46 speaks of the consequences of disunity: “And obey Allah and His 
Messenger, and do not dispute and [thus] lose courage and [then] your strength 
would depart; and be patient. Indeed, Allah is with the patient.”
These Quranic verses are affirmed by an authentic (sahih) prophetic 
tradition:
A Muslim is a brother to a Muslim. He should neither deceive him nor lie to 
him, nor leave him without assistance. Everything belonging to a Muslim is 
inviolable for a Muslim; his honor, his blood, and property. . . . It is enough 
for a Muslim to commit evil by despising his Muslim brother.13
In another tradition, the Prophet counsels his followers to “help your 
brother, whether he is an oppressor or he is an oppressed one. People asked, 
11Tafsir Ibn Kathir, Surah 3 Al-i ‘Imran, Ayaat 102 to 103 (http://www.alim.org/library/
quran/AlQuran-tafsir/TIK/3/102). According to al-Tabari, “the rope of Allah” carries 
many meanings, including the Quran, Islam, refuge (al-amaan), God’s covenant (‘ahd 
allah), and devotion to Him alone (bil-ikhlas lih wahdeh) (https://mufl hun.com/3/102-
104?tafid=8167#103)
12Tafsir Ibn Kathir, Surah 3 Al-i ‘Imran, Ayaat 102 to 103 (http://www.alim.org/library/
quran/AlQuran-tafsir/TIK/3/102).
13Hadith in Jami’ al-Tirmidhi, Book 1, Hadith 234 (https://sunnah.com/riyadusaliheen 
/1/234). 
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‘O Allah’s Messenger! It is all right to help him if he is oppressed, but how 
should we help him if he is an oppressor?’ The Prophet said, ‘By preventing 
him from oppressing others.’”14 The importance of unity is accentuated by the 
consequences of breaking with Muslim fraternity: “If two Muslims confront 
each other with swords, and one kills the other, they will both be in Hell.” 
When asked why the slain Muslim is destined to Hell, the Prophet replied 
“He wanted to kill his companion.”15 The Prophet even associated infi hting 
with infid lity: “Do not revert to disbelief after me by striking (cutting) the 
necks of one another.”16
Debating the Legitimacy of Islamist Divisions
Although these Quranic verses and prophetic traditions clearly prevail upon 
Muslims to remain united and avoid infi hting, they do not settle the issue 
of who is the source of division and how best to deal with it when it arises. 
Two narratives have emerged to address division among Sunni Islamists. 
The fi st, associated with extremist factions, is the Victorious Sect narrative, 
which insists that all division is unacceptable in Islam and that unity behind 
the paradigm of the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih) is the only acceptable 
solution to division. Those who deviate from the Salafist paradigm, especially 
its most militant version, are not fit to lead other Islamists on the battlefi ld 
because they will lead them astray or can be easily enticed to compromise 
the goals of the movement.
The second narrative turns the tables on the extremists by arguing that 
their claims of exclusive religious rectitude and violence against other Islamists 
is a reversion to Khawarjism, a reference to the historical Kharijites that fought 
against Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth Caliph, because he chose to suspend fi ht-
ing against Mu‘awiyah in the battle of Siffi and agreed to arbitration to end 
the fi st Muslim civil war. One of the most comprehensive examples of this 
alternative narrative comes from Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Although written several 
decades before the rise of the Islamic State, his primer on Islamist divisions 
anticipates their Victorious Sect narrative and offers an incisive critique of this 
argument. Al-Qaradawi insists that there are two types of divisions in Islam: 
disagreements over creed (al-ikhtilaf al-i‘atiqadi), which are unacceptable and 
14Hadith in Sahih al-Bukhari 2444, Book 46, Hadith 5 (https://sunnah.com/
bukhari/46/5). 
15Hadith in Sunan al-Nasa’i 4118, Book 37, Hadith 153 (https://sunnah.com/nasai 
/37/153). 
16Hadith in Sahih al-Bukhari 7077, Book 92, Hadith 28 (https://sunnah.com/
bukhari/92/28).
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harmful, and disagreements over jurisprudence (al-ikhtilaf al-fiqhi), which are 
acceptable and benefic al. Those who confuse this distinction and kill fellow 
Muslims based on legitimate disagreements over debatable issues (masail 
ijtihadiya) are engaging in religious extremism (al-ghulou fil-din) associated 
with the detested Kharijites.
Extremist Narrative: The Victorious Sect Rejects Any Division
According to the extremist view, usually associated with Salafist factions, 
there is only one true religion and a core of acceptable interpretations of that 
religion, represented by the way of the pious ancestors (manhaj al-salaf al-
salih). The latter is also known as ahl al-sunna wal-jama‘ah, which roughly 
translates to “adherents of the right practice and communal solidarity.”17 
Contemporary Salafism is a strand of Islamism that idealizes the fi st three 
generations of Muslims (or first three hundred years of Islam). These formative 
generations lived through the prophetic mission of Muhammad; produced 
the Rightly Guided Successors (al-khulafa al-rashidun); standardized the 
Quranic canon and bequeathed it to all future generations as a single, unal-
terable text; witnessed the companions of the Prophet (sahaba) spread Islam 
beyond the Arabian Peninsula; collected prophetic traditions (ahl al-hadith) 
and produced erudite scholars that closely followed the way of the Prophet 
and his companions (al-tabi‘un). Collectively, these categories of people are 
referred to as al-Salaf. In their era, they rejected heterodoxy and insisted on 
purifying religious practices from heretical beliefs, speculative philosophy, 
cultural accretions, and ritualistic innovations. For them, as for contempo-
rary Salafists, the Prophet’s life and that of his companions, both men and 
women, provide an abundance of examples of how they would have acted in 
different situations and ruled on various issues, so their model is normative 
at all times and in all places. Therefore, following closely in the footsteps of 
the Prophet and the inherited traditions bequeathed by the pious ancestors 
(athar al-salaf) is the best one can do to reach for perfection in the present 
and ensure salvation in the hereafter.18
In Salafist discourse, factionalism among Muslims is associated with 
dividing into sects and excessive partisanship (hizbiyyah) that led previous 
monotheistic traditions astray. They cite verses 23:52–53, “And indeed this, 
your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so fear me. But the people 
divided their religion among them into sects—each faction, in what it has, 
rejoicing.” According to the exegesis of Ibn Kathir, they are “rejoicing” in their 
17Crone 2006, 126.
18For a good introduction on Salafism, see Haykel 2013, 33–57.
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misguidance.19 Thus, division among Muslims is rooted in deviation from the 
way of the salaf. Division derives from doctrinal innovation (bid‘ah), which is 
impermissible. They repeat a commonly cited prophetic tradition:
Whoever lives among you will see many disputes, so beware of newly in-
vented matters for they are misguidance. Whoever sees them must adhere 
to my tradition and the tradition of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Cling to it 
with your molars.20
They proceed to assert that when Muslims divide into factions, one of 
them is destined to rise above all others because of its doctrinal purity and 
God’s promise of victory. Th s Victorious Sect (al-taifa al-mansoura21) has 
been foretold in the prophetic traditions:
Hadith narrated by ‘Awf bin Malik: The Jews split into seventy-one sects, one 
of which will be in Paradise and seventy in Hell. The Christians split into 
seventy-two sects, seventy-one of which will be in Hell and one in Paradise. 
I swear by the One Whose Hand is the soul of Muhammad, my nation will 
split into seventy-three sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-
two in Hell. It was said: “O Messenger of Allah, who are they?” He said: “The 
main body” [al-Jama‘ah].22
Th s hadith is presented as prooftext that one group (al-jama‘ah, with the 
defin te article al-) possesses the authentic creed while all others are devi-
ants and innovators. They cite another hadith as prooftext that al-jama‘ah is 
destined to triumph:
A group of people from my nation [umma] will always remain triumphant on 
the right path and continue to be triumphant (against their opponents). He 
who deserts them shall not be able to do them any harm. They will remain 
in this position until Allah’s Command is executed.23
Th s raises the question of how does one know the characteristics of this 
Victorious Sect? Th ee documents are useful in answering this question from 
19Tafsir Ibn Kathir, Surah 23 Al-Mu’minun, Ayyat 51 to 56 (http://www.alim.org/
library/quran/AlQuran-tafsir/TIK/23/51).
20Hadith in Jami’ al-Tirmidhi 2676, Book 41, Hadith 32 (https://sunnah.com/tirmi-
dhi/41/32). 
21It is also referred to as al-firqa al-najiyya (The Saved Sect).
22Hadith in Sunan Ibn Majah 3992, Book 36, Hadith 67 (https://sunnah.com/ibnmajah 
/36/67). A similar hadith is narrated by Abdullah bin ‘Amr in Jami’ al-Tirmidhi 2641, Book 
40, Hadith 36 (https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/40/36).
23Hadith in Sahih Muslim 1920, Book 33, Hadith 245 (https://sunnah.com/muslim 
/33/245).
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the viewpoint of the extremists in civil wars. The fi st comes from the Algerian 
civil war during the 1990s, written by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which 
not only fought against the secular Algerian regime, but also fought against 
rival Islamist factions, especially the Islamic Salvation Army. The document is 
a manifesto titled Hidayat Rab al-‘Alameen fi Tabyeen Usul al-Salafiyeen wa ma 
Yajib min al-‘Ahd ‘ala al-Mujahidin (The Guidance of the Lord of the Universe 
in Clarifying the [Religious] Basis of the Salafists and What is Required for 
the Oath [of Allegiance] by the Islamic Fighters).24 The second comes from 
the Iraqi insurgency during the 2000s, written by a supporter of Al-Qaida in 
Iraq (AQI), which not only fought against the American occupation and the 
Iraqi government, but also fought against rival Iraqi Islamist factions. The 
document is titled Ma‘alim al-Taifa al-Mansoura fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (The 
Markers of the Victorious Sect in Mesopotamia).25 The third comes from the 
Syrian civil war that began in 2011. It is a speech that justifies the creation of 
the Islamic State despite the tension and criticism it has generated within the 
rebel movement. The audio recording is titled Lan Yudhurukum ila Adhan 
(They Can Never Harm You Beyond Annoyance).26
In the Algerian manifesto, the author Abu Abderrahman Amin (also 
known as Jamal al-Zaytouni), the fourth leader of the GIA (1994–1996), 
outlines the foundations of GIA’s way (manhaj). He begins by affirming that 
it is an obligation on every Muslim to know the features and characteristics 
of the Victorious Sect because it alone “will protect the faithful and shield it 
from darkness.” He goes on to say that not everyone who raises the banner of 
jihad, even if they call themselves Salafists, are pure Islamists. Only those who 
follow closely the creed of ahl al-sunna wal-jama‘ah, in both interpretation 
and action, are the Saved Sect.
Anticipating the arguments of critics, he declares that “following in the 
footsteps of the fi st generations .  .  . is not limited to matters of creed and 
24The original document was collected by the author in London in 1998 and can 
be accessed online at https://www.academia.edu/39128671/GIA_Manifesto_Partial_ 
Summary_Translation_of_The_Armed_Islamic_Groups_Manifesto_and_Original_
Arabic_Text.
25The original Arabic document, published in December 2004, was downloaded from 
Manbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (www.tahwed.ws) in 2006. However, that website is no longer 
available. The document can be accessed at from the author’s personal website at https://
www.academia.edu/39129682/Markers_of_the_Victorious_Sect.
26Speech by Abu-Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, ISIS spokesman, produced by 
the Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production and distributed by the Al-I‘itisam 
Establishment for Media Production. It was downloaded from the Hanin Network Forums 
(http://www.hanein.info/vb), accessed August 1, 2013.
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worship only, but also in matters of preference, action, and thought.” The GIA 
“only abides by the three foundations of religion: the Book [i.e., the Quran], 
the sunnah [i.e., prophetic sayings and practice], and the consensus of the 
pious ancestors.” The GIA strives to create an Islamic Caliphate in accordance 
with the prophetic way and make the Book and the Sunnah as the reference 
point in all matters of faith, creed, morality, politics, society, and economics. 
It does not believe in the consequentialist philosophy of the “ends justify the 
means,” which is an implicit critique of pragmatists that seek alliances with 
non-Islamist factions. Thus, the GIA rejects unity or alliances with groups that 
purportedly violate the Book or the Sunna, including the Muslim Brotherhood 
and other Algerian Islamists that advocate for democracy and civilizational 
coexistence. Islamists outside of the GIA will be fought based on what category 
they fall under: belligerents (muharibeen), offenders (bughat), hypocrites 
(munafiqeen), and those who secede from the community (Kharijites).27 It is 
important to note here that they do not deem rival Islamists as kuffar (infid ls), 
thus leaving the door open for repentance and future reconciliation.
In the Iraqi document, Abu al-Islam al-Ansari summarizes in 48 pages a 
book written by Abi al-Fadil al-Iraqi. It outlines 41 features of the Victorious 
Sect, much of which affirms the standard Salafist doctrines of monotheism 
(tawhid ), God’s sovereignty, the objection to Shiism, and the legitimacy of 
takfi . More telling is item number 22, which declares “we believe that any 
sect of people that unites on a principle other than Islam is a sect of apostacy 
and infid lity. These include nationalist, patriotic, communist, Baathist, and 
socialist parties.” Many of the Iraqi insurgent factions combined Islamism 
with Iraqi nationalism, a fact that eventually served as a pretext for AQI to 
attack their rivals in the rebel movement.
According to the document, there are acts that exclude Muslims from 
inclusion into the ranks of the Victorious Sect. Item number 28 states, “we 
believe that Islamic groups that enter into elections or parliaments are deviat-
ing groups ( jama‘at bid‘ya).” Some of the major Iraqi insurgent factions were 
linked to the Iraqi Islamic Party that called for electoral and parliamentary 
participation.
There are acts that are required of the Victorious Sect. Item number 34 
declares, “we believe that jihad is continuous until the Day of Judgement with 
each and every proflig te sinner in all places and all times, with or without a 
religious leader.” The Victorious Sect, in other words, is in a state of permanent 
revolution without regard to territorial boundaries or worldly authorities.
27For an expansive discussion of the GIA’s political philosophy and its war with other 
Islamists, see Hafez 2017, 1–26.
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In the Syrian audio recording, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, the spokesman 
for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), responds to criticism that his 
organization is coercing other factions into pledging loyalty to ISIS. Although 
he denies the veracity of these accusations, he proceeds to explain the sources 
of tension between ISIS and other Islamist factions.
“Our project stands against two projects,” says al-‘Adnani. The fi st is the 
creation of “a civil, democratic state, which is a secular project sponsored by 
all the infid l states despite their confli ting interests and programs.”
The only acceptable order is the one established by Islam, which is God’s 
sovereign rule in all aspects of life as practiced by the Prophet and the pious 
ancestors. The rejection of a democratic state pits ISIS against several Islamist 
factions that do not see any contradiction between Islam and democracy. 
They do not wish to replace a secular dictatorship with an Islamist one, and 
they see the application of Islamic law as a gradual process that must be pre-
ceded by proper education and socialization of the public in order to avoid 
compulsion in religion.
The second project ISIS opposes is the maintenance of national states, even 
if they are led by Islamists. “Th s project,” adds al-‘Adnani, “is Islamic only in 
appearance. In fact, it is a nationalist state project that submits to the tyrants 
of the West and succumbs to those of the East, with the aim of derailing the 
course of jihad and stabbing it in the heart.” Whereas ISIS sees a contradic-
tion between territorial nationalism and Islamism, several Islamist factions in 
Syria, including the Salafists of Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement and Jaysh 
al-Islam, were fi hting for Islamic states while also insisting on maintaining 
the territorial integrity of the Syrian national state against Kurdish separatists 
and transnational jihadists.
Another source of rupture within the Islamist movement is the reliance 
of some factions on external support from Gulf countries and western states 
in their grueling fi ht against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, backed by Russia, 
Iran, and regional Shiite militias. For ISIS, Islamist alliances based on mutual 
interests not only violate several Quranic injunctions, such as the ones found 
in verse 4:101, “And never will the Jews or the Christians approve of you until 
you follow their religion,” but it also compromises the purity and compre-
hensiveness of the Islamist project. As al-‘Adnani explains, “If you believe 
that you are more ingenious than the devils of America and smarter than the 
Western and Eastern intelligence services, then you should learn your lesson 
from your peers in Iraq. . . . They tried your futile project and walked your 
same dead-end road.” To put a fi e point on it, al-‘Adnani asks rhetorically: 
“Do the leaders of the truthful and sincere mujahidin travel under the auspices 
of the tyrants between capitals, where hotels are open to them and satellite 
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channels grant them priority, while aid is given to them through intelligence 
services? Is this the way of the prophets? Are those mujahidin?”
In summary, the concept of the Victorious Sect has become the basis upon 
which Islamist extremists differentiate their faction from other Islamists, thus 
opening the door to challenge them on the battlefi ld. The Victorious Sect is 
defi ed by its adherence to Islamic orthodoxy; its idealization of Islamic law as 
the perfect normative and legal system by which to govern Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects in all aspects of life; its elevation of jihad as a requirement of 
the faith; its insistence on establishing both an Islamic state and, eventually, 
an Islamic caliphate without regard to the modern international system of 
territorially sovereign states; and its rejection of alliances with non-Muslim 
forces and insistence on unity of effort under a single organizational banner. 
Conversely, Islamists that believe in establishing civil democratic states, or 
those that fi ht for an Islamic order while upholding the territorial integrity 
of extant national states, or those that make alliances with secular factions 
or western governments fall outside of the righteous ranks of the Victorious 
Sect.28
Moderate Narrative: Distinguishing between Creed and  
Jurisprudence in Islamist Disagreements
Yusuf al-Qaradawi takes on the issue of Islamist divisions in his book al-Sahwa 
al-Islamiyya Bayn al-Ikhtilaf al-Mashro‘u wal-Tafaruq al-Madhmum (The 
Islamic Awakening Between Legitimate Disagreement and Objectionable 
Division).29 Although written in 1989, the book’s arguments are of contempo-
rary relevance for three reasons. Firstly, it anticipates many of the issues that 
have divided Islamists on the battlefi ld in Algeria, Iraq, and Syria from the 
1990s to the present time. Therefore, the book’s extraordinary prescience makes 
it particularly worthy of our consideration. Secondly, the book was written 
as a primer to Islamist activists, which suggests that it would have received a 
wider readership than if it had been written strictly as a scholarly treatise. The 
fact that it was printed again by a Cairenes press in 2001 is evidence that the 
28For a comprehensive treatment of the Victorious Sect from a Jihadi Salafist theo-
retician, see Halima (Abu Basir al-Tartousi) 1993. The 172-page document, in Arabic, 
was downloaded from Manbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (www.tahwed.ws) in 2007, but that 
website is no longer active. It is now available at the author’s personal website https://www.
academia.edu/39129513/Victorious_Sect_Abu_Basir_Al_Tartousi. 
29The book was published in December 1989 in Doha, Qatar. The original version 
does not identify the publisher, but another version of it was published in 2001 by Dar 
al-Shurouq in Cairo, Egypt. A PDF version can be accessed at https://www.al-qaradawi.
net/sites/default/files/pdf/1230d-alsahwa-alislamia.pdf.
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book was not of passing interest. Additionally, it is available for free online 
through several websites at present. Thi dly, Al-Qaradawi is widely affiliated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, including its Palestinian off pring 
Hamas. Al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas are often attacked 
by Salafists for their presumed religious deviations and compromising politics, 
so Al-Qaradawi’s arguments are likely to reflect the response of Muslim Broth-
erhood factions to these critiques.30 Ultimately, one cannot be certain of the 
extent of Al-Qaradawi’s influence within the ranks of armed Islamist groups, 
but his arguments represent a comprehensive and authoritative alternative to 
the Victorious Sect narrative.
Al-Qaradawi advances three points that build a counterargument to the 
extremist narrative of the Victorious Sect.
1. The Prophet Muhammad predicted division among Muslims, so the 
matter is inevitable.
2. There are two types of divisions, one over creed and the other over 
jurisprudence. The former is unacceptable and can lead to tribula-
tions; the latter is not only acceptable, but it is actually a sign of God’s 
mercy that Muslims can pursue different options based on their cir-
cumstances.
3. The best way for Islamist factions to avoid harming their collective 
movement is to cooperate on matters of mutual understanding and 
tolerate disagreements when confli ting viewpoints arise.
Al-Qaradawi begins his exposition by citing the numerous Quranic verses 
and prophetic traditions entreating fraternity among Muslims, including verse 
3:103. However, he proceeds to cite a hadith that asserts the inevitability of 
division in Islam:
I asked my Lord, the Mighty and Sublime, for three things, of which He gave 
me two and did not grant me one. I asked my Lord not to destroy us with 
which he destroyed the nations before us, and He granted me that. And I 
asked my Lord not to let an enemy from without prevail over us, and He 
granted me that. And I asked my Lord not to divide us into warring factions 
[an la yalbisuna shey‘an] and He did not grant me that.31
30Cragin 2009, 576–590; Lynch 2010, 467–487; Polka 2019, 683–713.
31Hadith in Sunan an-Nasa’i 1638, Book 20, Hadith 41 (https://sunnah.com/na-
sai/20/41). A similar hadith is found in Sunan Ibn Majah 3951, Book 36, Hadith 26 (https://
sunnah.com/ibnmajah/36/26).
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Al-Qaradawi clarifies that the inevitability of Muslim infi hting is not 
caused by some divine affl tion, but rather refl cts the worldly reality that 
people will disagree and fi ht for one reason or another. Th s condition is 
inevitable, but not unavoidable at all times and in all circumstances. Muslims 
can overcome division, otherwise all the scriptural entreaties to unite would 
have been unwarranted.32 When Muslims divide into factions and fi ht with 
one another, the proper response is to reconcile their confli ts and restore 
their unity.
Al-Qaradawi proceeds to challenge the notion of the Victorious Sect. 
He insists that the aforementioned hadith regarding Muslims splitting into 
seventy-three sects, all of which except one are in Hell, has questionable au-
thenticity. Th s hadith does not appear in any of the two sahih (authoritative) 
canons of Bukhari and Muslim, both of which are known for their exception-
ally rigorous criteria for classifying reports of prophetic sayings as reliable. 
Moreover, one version of the hadith, narrated by Abu Hurairah stops at “and 
my community will be split up into seventy-three-sects.” It does not include 
the phrase, “one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-two in Hell.” All the 
other versions of this hadith have a weak chain of transmitters (isnad), yet, 
explains Al-Qaradawi, its inclusion in other hadith collections comes from 
the fact that several of the companions of the Prophet repeated some version 
of it.33 Moreover, claiming to be a Victorious Sect, argues Al-Qaradawi, is 
nothing more than self-righteous conceit, a practice the Quran warns about 
in verse 4:49: “Have you not seen those who claim themselves to be pure?”34
Al-Qaradawi asserts that there are two types of religious disagreements 
in Islam. The fi st pertains to disagreements over creed (‘aqidah) and the 
second relates to jurisprudence ( fi h). The fi st sort is a catastrophe and must 
be avoided at all costs because it can lead to trials and tribulations in Muslim 
lands. He does not explain why this type of disagreement is inherently more 
damaging than others, but presumably disputes about the foundations of the 
faith can permanently fragment the faithful as evinced by the Sunni versus 
Shi‘a schism. The second type, disagreements over jurisprudence, is both 
permissible and desirable. Indeed, it is evidence of God’s generosity that He 
permits believers to choose between different interpretations of scripture 
based on their circumstances. He cites the juristic dictum that “consensus 
32al-Qaradawi 1989, 45–46.
33al-Qaradawi 1989, 50–51.
34al-Qaradawi 1989, 223. Also see verse 53:32: “So do not claim yourselves to be pure; 
He is most knowing of who fears Him.”
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is irrefutable proof and disagreement is generous leniency” (ijma‘ahum hija 
qati‘ah, wa ikhtilafahum rahma wasi‘ah).35
There are issues subject to multiple interpretations (qadaya ijtihadiya) or 
that fall outside of the core requirements of the faith (al-furu‘u wal masail al-
juziyya). It is permissible to disagree on those issues and advance competing 
interpretations. According to a prophetic tradition, a judge who rules correctly 
based on his sincere effort and proper knowledge will be rewarded twice by 
God, once for his effort and another for being right; a judge who rules incor-
rectly will be rewarded once for his sincere effort.36 The pious ancestors and the 
pupils of the various schools of jurisprudence constantly debated what consti-
tutes proper ritual, personal conduct, and social relations between Muslims. 
Their division into at least four schools (madhahib) of Sunni jurisprudence 
does not violate the command to “hold fi mly the rope of Allah all together 
and do not become divided” and they are all considered legitimate sources 
of Islamic law. Moreover, on the authority of Ibn Taymiyyah, changing one’s 
opinion by shifting from one school to another or holding a mix of opinions 
from the four schools was deemed entirely permissible because the point is 
to pursue what is correct, not to adhere dogmatically to a school of thought.37
Islamic politics (al-siyasa al-shar‘iyya) is even more conducive to de-
bate than other matters in Islam, argues Al-Qaradawi. Whether one should 
challenge a ruler or not; do so with the pen or the sword; enter elections or 
abstain from the ballot box—all these issues are open to debate and do not 
put in doubt one’s sincerity of belief or his inclusion in the community of the 
faithful. Al-Qaradawi anticipates the practices of extremists such as the GIA, 
AQI, and ISIS:
One is perplexed and pained to no end when he fi ds some of those who 
work for Islam accuse others of being traitorous agents who are chasing after 
secularists and the enemies of Islam. They say about others: “He is an agent 
of the West or East, or to this or that regime,” simply because he disagrees 
with their opinions or some stance, or because he adopts means that differ 
from theirs.38
Al-Qaradawi does not go so far as to explicitly label contemporary extrem-
ists as Kharijites in his primer. However, he repeatedly compares modern-day 
extremists with the loathed Kharijites, implicitly connecting the two. Addi-
tionally, Al-Qaradawi reminds his readers that Ali Bin Abi Talib fought the 
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Kharijites to “repel their injustice and fanaticism, not because they became 
infid ls.”39 Refusing to call extremists infid ls is important for two reasons. 
First, it avoids the trap of takfi  that Salafists, especially the most radical 
among them, deem to be a legitimate practice. Second, it leaves the door open 
for reconciliation between previously warring factions, an important step to 
restoring unity in Islamist movements.
Less forgiving Islamists do not hesitate to label groups like ISIS as neo-
Kharijites (khawarij al-‘asr) and proceed to fi ht them on this basis.40 Th y 
cite a prominent tradition in which the Prophet Muhammad predicts the rise 
of the Kharijites and orders them killed:
In the last days (of the world) there will appear young people with foolish 
thoughts and ideas. They will give good talks, but they will go out of Islam 
as an arrow goes out of its game, their faith will not exceed their throats. So, 
wherever you fi d them, kill them, for there will be a reward for their killers 
on the Day of Resurrection.41
In the aforementioned video by Jaysh al-Islam, it labels ISIS fi hters as 
Kharijites to justify their execution. Interestingly, extremists such as the GIA 
and ISIS justifi d organizational purges by labeling as Kharijite those that 
they have liquidated.42
Al-Qardawi concludes his argument by introducing the “jurisprudence of 
disputation” (fiqh al-ikhtilaf).43 Th s jurisprudence advises Islamists to avoid 
denouncing each other based on their disagreements over religious issues 
that are subject to legitimate debate. They should prioritize the many daunt-
39al-Qaradawi 1989, 181.
40For examples, refer to the audio recording by Dr. Sami al-Uraydi, General Sha-
riah Offi al of Al-Nusrah Front, released on December 27, 2014 (https://twitter.com/
AMROOF1985/status/548834903433809921); communiqué by Ahrar al-Sham, issued 
on June 3, 2015 (https://twitter.com/islamic_front/status/606087409663647744); com-
muniqué #69 by Jaysh al-Islam, issued on June 15, 2015 (https://www.jaishalislam.com/
statement/69); and audio recording titled Caliphate of Oppression by Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri, leader of Al-Qaida, released on October 5, 2015 (https://twitter.com/mosbujn/
status/651004644563529729). 
41Hadith 82 in Sahih al-Bukhari, Book 66 (https://sunnah.com/bukhari/66/82). 
Other versions of this hadith do not mention the order to kill them, while one says, “If I 
[Prophet Muhammad] should be present at their time I would kill them as the nations 
of Thamud were killed.” Hadith 378 in Sahih al-Bukhari, Book 64 (https://sunnah.com/
bukhari/64/378). 
42For examples, see GIA communiqué #35 in al-Ansar, newsletter no. 101, June 15, 
1995; and Bunzel 2019.
43al-Qaradawi 1989, 191. 
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ing challenges and mutual crises facing Muslims across the globe and, thus, 
refrain from division over side disputes.44 He summarizes the jurisprudence 
of disputation in an aphorism he borrows from the Syrian Islamic reformer 
Muhammad Rashid Rida: “We cooperate in areas of mutual agreement and 
we tolerate our disagreements.”45
Conclusion
In December 2015, as ISIS began losing substantial territory due to the com-
bined effort of international forces and local rivals, including several Islamist 
factions, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the self-declared caliph of the Islamic State, 
released an audio recording in which he declared:
O Muslims! Do not be surprised at how the infid l nations, states, and 
sects fl ck together against the Islamic State. Th s has been the case for the 
Victorious Sect throughout history. . . . The more nations unite against it, 
the more it becomes confide t in God’s victory. It is following the straight 
path. The more hardships it suffers, the more it banishes the pretentious 
and the hypocrites.46
Th s message is emblematic of the crisis of jihadism in the last three decades. 
Islamists with extreme worldviews and tactics invariably fragment their move-
ments, coalesce their adversaries into a single opposing camp, and descend 
into wars with less doctrinaire Islamists—“the pretentious and the hypocrites” 
in Al-Baghdadi’s parlance. Th s recurring pattern belies the assertion that ex-
tremists harbor an advantage in civil wars.47 Instead, it seems to confi m the 
irrationality of extremism in complex, multiparty confli ts where coalition 
building and unity of effort is essential for victory.48
Islamist factional confli ts are more relevant than ever because of the 
rise of the Islamic State and its spread across multiple countries. As a leading 
44He outlines seven crises that should concern all Muslims and unite all Islamists: (1) 
the scientific, technological, and cultural backwardness of Muslims in the modern world; 
(2) the prevailing social and economic injustice; (3) the enduring political oppression and 
authoritarianism; (4) the pervasive cultural and intellectual invasion from the west; (5) 
the unending Zionist aggression; (6) the partitioning of the Arab and Muslim world; and 
(7) the degradation of personal morality. al-Qaradawi 1989, 137.
45al-Qaradawi 1989, 159.
46Audio released on December 26, 2015 by Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Pro-
duction with the title So Wait! We Too Are Waiting Along with You (https://twitter.com/
FufuffyTrtee/status/680766950750945281).
47Walter 2017, 7–39.
48Hafez 2018, 86–99. 
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fratricidal rebel group, the Islamic State has set in motion intense confli ts 
with rival Islamist groups in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Th s 
article has addressed the religious narratives that these factional confl cts 
have spawned over the years. It contrasts two narratives that rationalize 
and publicly justify factional wars in Islamist movement  Although both 
narratives acknowledge the Quranic and prophetic injunctions against 
infighting, the extremist narrative of the Victorious Sect permits the killing 
of Islamists who advance political projects that undermine the establishment 
of an Islamic state based on the Salafist paradigm. Islamists that exhibit 
political realism are portrayed as the source of division because they are 
insufficiently righteous to lead the Islamist rebel movement and must, 
therefore, either unite with the Victorious Sect or step out of the way to 
allow the ideologically pure banner to rise above the rest.
The alternative narrative rejects the notion of the Victorious Sect and 
insists that division in Islam is both permissible and desirable. Drawing a 
dividing line between disagreements over creed and ones over jurisprudence, 
critics assert that extremists today resemble the historical Kharijites who have 
been rejected by the consensus of the pious ancestors. Extremists, therefore, 
must be fought back until their aggression ceases just as Ali Bin Abi Talib 
fought them without going so far as to call them infid ls. The best way for 
Islamists to avoid shedding inviolable blood is to adopt the “jurisprudence of 
disputation,” which calls for cooperation in areas of mutual agreement and 
tolerance of difference when disagreements arise. Avoiding side disputes and 
maintaining a singular focus on the top priorities that preoccupy Muslims is 
the surest way to advance the Islamist project.
Whether these narratives actually cause factional infi hting or are just 
mere rationalizations that cloak the naked quest for power is still an open 
debate. However, the fact that Islamists have shed so much ink explaining 
why they shed each other’s blood suggests that these debates are important in 
maintaining their public legitimacy, responding to their critics, and perhaps 
motivating their rank-and-file to continue fighting debilitating factional wars. 
What is certain, however, is that Islamists do not view Islamic injunctions 
against Muslims killing one another as an unsurmountable barrier to their 
pursuit of factional hegemony. The case of Islamist fratricide once again illus-
trates the ductility of the Islamic tradition. Like the proverbial robe of Allah, 
it can be flung in many directions and twisted into tangled knots. And it 
can turn into a noose by which to hang one’s brothers in arms.
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